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Abstract
Due to continued stress during the Global Financial Crisis, the US Treasury released a series
of additional measures in February 2009 that included a mandatory stress test for major U.S.
bank holding companies (BHCs), backed by government capital. The stress test, known as
the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), tested the capital adequacy of the 19
U.S. BHCs that had more than $100 billion in assets. A large interagency team of regulators
and other experts estimated losses and income under two hypothetical scenarios for the
group of BHCs: a baseline that reflected the consensus belief about the course of the current
recession, and a more adverse scenario that reflected a deeper recession. The estimated loan
losses under the more adverse scenario were higher than realized losses at any point in U.S.
history. Ten of the 19 BHCs were required to increase their capital by a total of $75 billion,
of which $65 billion had to be in the form of common equity. The 10 BHCs had six months to
increase capital by issuing new shares, selling assets, curtailing payments to shareholders,
or changing the composition of their capital by converting preferred shares or debt into
common equity. If those sources were unavailable, they could apply for government capital
through a backstop facility known as the Capital Assistance Program (CAP). Other banks,
even if they were not part of the SCAP exercise, could also apply to CAP. Under CAP, Treasury
would buy mandatorily convertible preferred shares in an institution, subject to certain
restrictions. The shares had onerous terms to encourage institutions to find other sources of
capital: they paid dividends of 9 percent, required a halt to dividend payments on other
shares, came with limits on executive compensation, and contained warrants that allowed
Treasury to purchase additional common stock. Ultimately, no institutions applied for CAP
funds, and it terminated in November 2009. Academics and policymakers praised the
stringency of the test as well as the Federal Reserve’s controversial decision to publicly
release the details and results. They also argued that the availability of government capital
through CAP was an essential fallback option supporting the stress test exercise. The Fed
intended its capital targets to be high enough that banks could continue lending to
creditworthy borrowers during an economic downturn, rather than merely survive.

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot
Project modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis.
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
2 Aidan Lawson – Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
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Ultimately, all but one of the institutions that the stress test identified as needing capital
were able to obtain private capital without further government support.
Keywords: Broad-based capital injections, CAP, capital backstop, Global Financial Crisis,
preferred stock, stress tests, United States, SCAP
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The US Supervisory Capital Assessment Program
(SCAP) and Capital Assistance Program (CAP)
At a Glance
The passage of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act (EESA) on October 3,
2008, marked the beginning of the US
government’s aggressive intervention in
the banking system. The Treasury first
used its authority under EESA to create
the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), in
which it purchased $205 billion of
preferred equity in 707 public and
private banks, S-corporations, and
mutual banks.
Markets, however, continued to struggle
into early 2009. As part of a series of
additional measures, Treasury released
a plan in February 2009 that included
mandatory stress tests for major US
bank holding companies (BHCs) and a
government capital backstop for
institutions that the stress test found to
need capital but that were unable to
raise capital from private sources.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To ensure the continued ability of the largest US
financial institutions to lend to creditworthy borrowers
by aggressively testing their capital resilience with a
heavy emphasis on common equity.
Announcement date

February 10, 2009

Operational date

February 25, 2009

Sunset date

November 9, 2009

Program size

An estimated $300 billion was
available but the exact size
was unspecified

Usage

Not used

Outcomes

Rather than accept CAP capital,
10 banks increased common
equity by $76.6 billion through
various means and the
government recapitalized
GMAC through another
program

Mandatory conversion after 7
The stress tests, known as the
Key features
years, 20% step-up clause,
Supervisory
Capital
Assessment
initial stress-test component
Program (SCAP), tested the capital
adequacy of the 19 US BHCs that had
more than $100 billion in assets. A team of more than 150 regulators and other experts from
a variety of institutions (including the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation) estimated losses and income under two hypothetical scenarios for
the group of BHCs. The baseline scenario reflected the consensus expectations of
professional forecasters about the depth and duration of the recession; the more adverse
scenario featured a longer and more severe recession. The scenarios were based on
estimates of real GDP, unemployment, and house prices. The estimated loan losses under the
more adverse scenario were higher than realized losses at any point in U.S. history, including
during the Great Depression. The output of the SCAP exercise was an estimate of the amount
of common equity each bank would have in the two scenarios. The Federal Reserve released
the results in May 2009. It required 10 of the 19 BHCs to raise a total of $75 billion in capital,
mostly in the form of common equity.

893

Lawson

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

The 10 BHCs that failed the stress test had six months to obtain capital either through private
sources or via a government backstop facility known as the Capital Assistance Program
(CAP). Banks that did not undergo the stress tests could also apply to the Treasury for a
government capital injection through CAP. Under CAP, the Treasury would purchase new
mandatorily convertible preferred shares that were convertible to common equity at a slight
discount to the institution’s average stock price. The shares paid a relatively onerous 9
percent dividend and contained 10-year warrants that allowed the Treasury to purchase
additional common stock, though the Treasury pledged not to exercise voting rights with
respect to this stock. CAP shares also included executive compensation and corporate
governance restrictions. Ultimately, the Treasury required no institutions to use the facility,
and no institutions voluntarily applied for CAP funds.
Summary Evaluation
The Fed’s decision to release the details and results of the stress tests boosted investor
confidence and helped stabilize financial markets, although such transparency ran against
standard supervisory practice at the time. Market participants and experts generally praised
the stringency of the capital requirements resulting from the severe loss rates in the SCAP.
They tended to view the stress test as a valuable exercise, with government capital available
through CAP as an essential fallback option. The Fed intended its capital targets to be high
enough for banks to be well-capitalized to support the economy, rather than merely survive.
No banks used CAP. Most were able to obtain capital from private sources, as government
officials had hoped. One firm that failed the stress test, GMAC, received government capital
through a separate program. Stress testing became a regular part of bank supervision in the
U.S. following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.
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United States Context 2009 -2010
GDP
$14,628.0 billion in Q4 2009
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$15,240.8 billion in Q4 2010
USD)
GDP per capita
$47,100 in 2009
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to
$48,468 in 2010
USD)
As of Q4, 2009:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior
debt)
As of Q4, 2010:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
$9,789.1 billion in total assets in
2009
Size of banking system
$9,292.3 billion in total assets in
2010
Size of banking system as a percentage of
66.9% in 2009
GDP
61.0% in 2010
Assets equal to 30.2% of financial
Size of banking system as a percentage of
system in 2009
financial system
Assets equal to 28.5% of financial
system in 2010
44.3% of total banking assets in
2009
Five-bank concentration of banking system
46.0% of total banking assets in
2010
19.0% of total banking assets in
2009
Foreign involvement in banking system
16.0% of total banking assets in
2010
0% of banks owned by the state in
Government ownership of banking system
2010
100% insurance on deposits up to
$100,000 for 2007
Existence of deposit insurance
100% insurance on deposits up to
$250,000 for 2010
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation
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Overview
Background
On October 3, 2008, the U.S. Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
(EESA) in response to the Global Financial Crisis (P.L. 110-343). The primary component of
this Act, called the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), authorized the Treasury to create
a variety of programs to alleviate stress in banks and other sectors, such as housing and the
automobile industry (TARP Programs; P.L. 110-343). The largest of these programs was the
Capital Purchase Program (CPP), in which the US Treasury bought an unprecedented $205
billion of preferred equity in banks (listed and unlisted), S-corporations, and mutual banks.
The Treasury encouraged broad participation by banks in the CPP on a voluntary basis. It
chose to purchase preferred shares in banks, rather than common equity, to prevent the
government from becoming a significant or controlling shareholder in private companies
and to protect taxpayers, since preferred shares rank higher than common equity in the
capital structure (Jester, Nason, and Norton 2020).
The CPP began accepting applications on October 14, 2008. Nine of the largest US bank
holding companies (BHCs) agreed to participate at the outset of the program.3 Participation
by these nine institutions was publicly announced to “collectively signal the importance of
the program for the system” (UST PR, 10/14/2008). Ultimately, the Treasury disbursed $205
billion to 707 banks and trusts through the CPP and realized a net return of $21.5 billion
(CPP Transaction Data; TARP: Monthly Update).
The Treasury’s financial market assistance continued with the creation of the Systemically
Significant Failing Institutions (SSFI) program alongside the CPP and other TARP programs.
It used the SSFI program to inject $40 billion in capital into American International Group
(AIG), the country’s largest insurance company in November of 2008 (UST Report December
2008). The Treasury injected a further $30 billion into AIG in March 2009 as its losses
mounted (AIG Financial Supplement Q3 2010). The Treasury created the Targeted
Investment Program (TIP) in December 2008 to support two of the CPP’s largest
beneficiaries, Bank of America and Citigroup; they each received $20 billion in preferred
equity under TIP (UST: TIP).
Despite these interventions, markets continued to struggle through 2008 and into early
2009. Investors remained concerned about the adequacy of capital at the largest financial
institutions. The Obama administration introduced two major policy initiatives in February
2009. The first was the Financial Stability Plan, announced on February 10. The plan laid out

The nine BHCs were Citigroup ($25 billion), JP Morgan ($25 billion), Wells Fargo ($25 billion), Bank of
America ($15 billion), Morgan Stanley ($10 billion), Goldman Sachs ($10 billion), Merrill Lynch ($10 billion),
State Street ($3 billion), and Bank of New York Mellon ($2 billion) (SIGTARP 10/09/2009 – p. ,20; CPP
Transaction Data).
3
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a strategy to “attack our crisis on all fronts with our full arsenal of financial tools” (UST PR,
02/10/2009). It included public-private capital programs, consumer and business lending
initiatives, and increased transparency and accountability for firms obtaining TARP funds.
The Financial Stability Plan also featured a mandatory stress test for some of the largest
financial institutions, backed by government capital for institutions that were unable to raise
private capital (UST PR, 02/10/2009). The stress test and capital backstop came to be known
as the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) and the Capital Assistance Program
(CAP), respectively.
The administration’s second major initiative was the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (ARRA), which Congress passed on February 17, 2009. ARRA was a massive fiscal
stimulus plan designed to be “speedy, substantial, and sustained.” It provided more than
$700 billion in economic stimulus (Furman 2020).
Program Description
The Department of the Treasury released details of the Capital Assistance Program on
February 25, 2009, about two weeks after the initial announcement. The Fed launched the
stress test on the same day. It said it would use the stress test “to evaluate the capital needs
of the major US banking institutions under a more challenging economic environment”
(SCAP: Design and Implementation; UST PR, 02/25/2009).
The Treasury and Fed designed SCAP and CAP to address the widespread impression that
the largest US banks still had insufficient common equity to bear the potential losses in an
ongoing recession. With the CPP, the Treasury had successfully increased banks’ Tier 1
capital, but with preferred rather than common equity. Treasury and Fed officials designed
SCAP and CAP to incentivize banks to find their own path to increase common equity, while
drawing mostly on private investors. The hope was that, first, the results of the SCAP stress
tests would reassure investors about the solvency of the largest banks, encouraging them to
invest new capital; and, second, the terms of the government equity injection in CAP would
be so onerous that banks would try harder to find private-sector solutions.
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)
SCAP was a stress test for the largest US bank holding companies (BHCs), in which teams of
examiners “appl[ied] a consistent and systematic approach across the group to evaluate the
projected loss and resource estimates submitted by [the BHCs]” (SCAP: Design and
Implementation). Credit intermediation had slowed dramatically due to the recession and a
widespread loss of confidence in the banking system. Many of the largest financial
institutions posted significant credit and mark-to-market losses during the financial crisis.
Their capital was diminished, and they would be less able to absorb further losses should the
economy continue to worsen. The Treasury and Fed argued that the largest companies
needed “to hold additional capital to provide a buffer against higher losses than generally
expected” (SCAP: Design and Implementation).
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The Fed released two papers on SCAP in the spring of 2009. The first, released on April 24,
described the design of the recently concluded stress tests in detail. The second, released on
May 7, explained the results. More than 150 people from a variety of supervisory agencies
were organized into teams tasked with “examining a distinct aspect of the loss and resource
projections across all 19 participating BHCs” (SCAP: Design and Implementation).
Any US bank holding company that had more than $100 billion in risk-weighted assets on a
consolidated basis was required to participate and provide projections of “their credit losses
and revenues for the two years 2009 and 2010, including the level of reserves that would be
needed at the end of 2010 to cover expected losses in 2011, under two alternative economic
scenarios” (SCAP: Design and Implementation).4 The first scenario, called the baseline,
“reflected the consensus expectation in February 2009 among professional forecasters on
the depth and duration of the recession.” The more adverse scenario “characterize[d] a
recession that [was] longer and more severe than the consensus expectation” (SCAP: Design
and Implementation). However, the more adverse scenario was not a “worst-case” scenario.
The Fed argued that the conditions of the stress test ought to be “severe but plausible” (SCAP:
Design and Implementation). See Figure 1 for a list of these institutions, which held about
two-thirds of the assets and more than half the loans in the US banking system (FRB PR,
04/24/2009).

4

All BHCs with more than $100 billion in assets at year-end 2008 were required to participate.
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Figure 1: Nineteen SCAP Bank Holding Companies, Year-End 2008 Assets and Tier 1
Capital
Bank Holding Company

Risk-weighted
($ billions)

American Express Company

$104.4

$10.1

Bank of America

$1,633.8

$173.2

BB&T

$109.8

$13.4

Bank of New York Mellon

$115.8

$15.4

Capital One

$131.8

$16.8

Citigroup

$996.2

$118.8

Fifth Third

$112.6

$11.9

GMAC

$172.7

$17.4

Goldman Sachs

$444.8

$55.9

JPMorgan Chase

$1,337.5

$136.2

KeyCorp

$106.7

$11.6

MetLife

$326.4

$30.1

Morgan Stanley

$310.6

$47.2

PNC

$250.9

$24,1

Regions

$116.3

$12.1

State Street

$69.6

$14.1

SunTrust

$162

$17.6

US Bancorp

$230.6

$24.4

Wells Fargo

$1,082.3

$86.4

Source: SCAP: Overview of Results
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The stress test was unprecedented in the US. “US bank supervisors had never used a
scenario-based stress test to assess the capital adequacy of banks and then required capital
increases based on what those results showed was needed”. Although the Treasury
announced SCAP, the Fed and other federal banking agencies were the ones who
administered the program to ensure that markets would believe that the results were
credible (Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020). The difficulty in accurately projecting and
assessing losses and revenues for the BHCs was amplified due to increased macroeconomic
stress and uncertainty during this period, but this was precisely the reason that the Fed felt
the tests were appropriate. The Fed argued that BHCs needed to “have sufficient resources
to continue to lend to creditworthy borrowers across a wide range of macroeconomic
outcomes” (SCAP: Design and Implementation).
Federal banking regulators assessed the vulnerabilities of each BHC using their loss
estimates for each scenario and then recommended the amount of capital the company
needed to raise to remain adequately capitalized at the end of the stress period, even in the
more adverse scenario (SCAP: Design and Implementation).
The Fed targeted two capital ratios to determine capital adequacy: banks needed to have a
Tier 1 capital ratio greater than six percent and a Tier 1 common equity ratio greater than
four percent at the end of 2010. For the denominator of both ratios—risk-weighted assets—
the Fed used banks’ actual balance-sheet figures at the end of 2008, plus any assets they had
to bring onboard due to accounting adjustments. The Fed used this conservative assumption
to prevent firms from shrinking their balance sheets to meet the target ratios. “Normally, the
easiest way to maintain a required capital ratio in a downturn is to pull back from lending or
shed assets—activities that only make a downturn worse” (Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020).
To calculate the numerators of the two capital ratios, each BHC was required to report its
projections of Tier 1 capital and common stockholders’ equity for the end of 2009 and 2010.
These projections served as a baseline for the recommendations that the government
assessors would ultimately make to the institutions. In making their recommendations, the
supervisors looked at the composition of the BHCs’ Tier 1 capital and paid close attention to
the amount of common equity each firm had, as common equity “generally should be the
dominant element within Tier 1 capital” (SCAP: Design and Implementation).
The BHCs that needed to increase their capital levels as a result of the stress tests had 30
days to develop a plan that, “wherever possible, actively seek(s) to raise new capital from
private sources”. Once its federal banking regulator approved its plan, a BHC had six months
to implement it. While the ultimate goal of the SCAP was to ensure the strength of the US
banking sector and reduce uncertainty to restore normal market functionality, the US
government also offered the CAP backstop as a source of government capital if a bank was
unable to obtain private capital (SCAP: Overview of Results).
Capital Assistance Program (CAP)
Treasury officials considered the approach of CAP to be similar to an “open bank resolution.”
An open bank resolution is essentially a recapitalization. Typically, common equity holders
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see the value of their shares diluted, in whole or in part; and existing preferred equity and
debt investors accept losses or convert their holdings into common equity. But Treasury
officials wanted to avoid the government taking common equity ownership in banks before
other options had been exhausted. They viewed common equity ownership as akin to
nationalization. The government had already taken control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
the two government-sponsored mortgage giants, and AIG, the largest insurance company. So
they chose mandatorily convertible preferred equity as their instrument. The new securities
were preferred, like those banks had issued to the Treasury in the earlier CPP program. But,
unlike those securities, they would be converted into common shares after seven years if
they had not been retired (see KDD #9 for more details). They imposed onerous terms – high
dividends, executive compensation limits, additional warrants, and limits on other dividends
- to encourage banks to build common equity through other means (Clark, Kabaker, and
Sachs 2020).
The Treasury and Fed described the CAP as an unlimited capital backstop (Clark, Kabaker,
and Sachs 2020, UST PR, 02/10/2009). The program had a total capacity of roughly $300
billion, which officials believed was sufficient to meet any potential needs. That sum included
about $100 billion in remaining TARP funds, plus the roughly $200 billion in existing CPP
preferred shares that the Treasury could convert into new CAP preferred shares if needed
(Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020).
All publicly traded, US-based banks, thrifts, and their holding companies (designated as
Qualifying Financial Institutions, or QFIs) were eligible to apply for CAP funds (CAP: Term
Sheet; UST PR, 02/10/2009). Institutions could submit their applications to their primary
federal banking regulator—the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), or Fed. That regulator would then submit its
recommendations to the Treasury, who had the final say on which institutions were
accepted. The deadline for institutions to apply was May 25, 2009 (CAP: FAQ). In the initial
term sheet, the Treasury said it was also working on developing applications for unlisted
institutions, S-corporations, and mutual banks, but it never released those documents (CAP:
Term Sheet).
If accepted, QFIs could issue mandatorily convertible preferred equity to the Treasury. The
Treasury then transferred the instruments to its Financial Stability Trust (CAP: Term Sheet;
UST PR, 02/10/2009). The objective of this trust was to “protect and create value for the
taxpayer as a shareholder over time” (FSOB Report, 03/31/2009). A QFI could issue an
amount of preferred stock equal to no less than 1% but no more than 2% of its risk-weighted
assets. A QFI needing capital greater than 2% was considered in need of “exceptional
assistance.” It would be required to submit that request to its federal banking regulator, who
would then consult with Treasury. The Treasury would potentially subject the recipient to
additional terms and conditions (CAP: Term Sheet).
The EESA required the Treasury to publish the name of any institution that issued preferred
stock under the CAP and the amount it invested in that institution. However, a QFI could
obtain confidentiality if it was able to “specifically demonstrate the harm (for example, loss
of competitive position, invasion of privacy) that would result from public release of
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information” (CAP: FAQ). The Treasury did not publicly release the names of applicants that
it did not approve for the program.
The Treasury generally modelled the terms of the CAP after its Capital Purchase Program
(CPP), which it created in October 2008. The key difference was that CAP preferred equity
was convertible into common stock (Convertible Preferred). The Fed focused on common
equity because it provides much greater loss-absorbing capacity and offers the most
protection to the more senior parts of the portfolio (SCAP: Overview of Results). The
Convertible Preferred was voluntarily convertible either in part or whole by the QFI or the
Treasury any time after the investment; it would automatically convert after seven years
(CAP: Term Sheet).5 Some of the characteristics of the Convertible Preferred were subject to
change based on the outcome of a shareholder vote conducted after the QFI issued the stock.
QFIs were required to call and pass a shareholder vote to authorize an increase in the
number of common stock such that the conversion of the Convertible Preferred and exercise
of the warrants could take place (CAP: Term Sheet).
Regardless of the method, the Treasury set the conversion price at “90% of the average
closing price for the common stock for the 20 trading day period ending February 9, 2009”.
However, the Treasury could reduce this price by 15% every six months following the initial
injection if the institution failed to receive the afore-mentioned stockholder approval to
increase the number of authorized common shares. The maximum price reduction was 45%.
If any stock remained outstanding after the mandatory conversion date (seven years), then
the Treasury was required to make “reasonable efforts” to sell at least 20% of its current
holdings of common equity every year until it owned no more equity (CAP: Term Sheet).
The Convertible Preferred paid cumulative dividends of 9%, though this rate could increase
to 20% six months after the original issue date if the shareholders had still not approved the
increase in common shares. If an institution did not pay the required dividends on the
Convertible Preferred for six quarters, consecutive or not, the Treasury would have the
ability to elect two directors to the institution’s board. This right would end once the
institution paid dividends for four consecutive quarters (CAP: Term Sheet).
The Treasury’s terms limited dividends on non-Treasury common stock to $0.01 as long as
any Convertible Preferred or Treasury-owned common stock remained outstanding. The
Treasury also prohibited QFIs from declaring dividends, paying dividends, or repurchasing
any equivalently ranked or junior preferred shares during this time (CAP: Term Sheet).
These terms were known as dividend stoppers.
QFIs could redeem the Convertible Preferred shares by issuing new common equity. To do
so, they needed the approval of their federal banking regulator. Also, the proceeds of any
such equity issuance had to equal at least 25% of the issue price of the Convertible Preferred

5 At the time of any conversion, the QFI was also required to pay “any accrued and unpaid dividends at its option

in either cash or shares of common stock.” These shares would be valued at the closing price on the second
preceding trading day (CAP: Term Sheet – p. 3). Treasury could also convert the preferred stock “upon specified
corporate events, including certain sales, mergers or changes of control of the QFI” (CAP: Term Sheet – p. 3).
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shares. Redemption was done either at par value (plus accrued and unpaid dividends) if done
within the first two years, or at the greater of par value plus accrued and unpaid dividends if
the stock had been converted (CAP: Term Sheet CAP).6
The Treasury could receive additional common stock by exercising the 10-year warrants
issued with the Convertible Preferred shares. These warrants, which were immediately
exercisable, allowed the Treasury to purchase common stock equal to 20% of the amount of
Convertible Preferred on the day of the initial investment. The exercise price was the same
as the conversion price in both its original level and thresholds for reduction (15% decrease
every 6 months, up to 45%). The Treasury pledged not to exercise any voting power with
respect to these shares (CAP: Term Sheet).
Other terms of CAP equity were also more onerous than CPP equity. Institutions that
participated in CAP faced restrictions on executive compensation. These restrictions were
originally specified in EESA and changed with the passage of the ARRA in February 2009
(UST Report, 06/10/2009).
Senior executive officers (SEOs), initially defined by EESA as the five highest-paid executives
of companies that took TARP money, were the primary targets of these restrictions (P.L. 110343). The government gradually increased the number of SEOs that were affected. SEOs of
TARP recipients were generally unable to receive “golden parachute” payments, bonuses,
and additional compensation. The legislation and subsequent interim final rules also
required compensation committees of QFIs to identify features that could “lead SEOs to take
unnecessary and excessive risks” and meet with risk officers to discuss these features (UST
Report, 06/10/2009).
As mentioned, institutions that were approved to issue Convertible Preferred shares in
excess of the 2% limit would be classified as needing “exceptional assistance” (CAP: Term
Sheet). The Treasury first made this distinction in its interim guidance in February 2009.
These firms would be subject to stricter executive compensation and corporate governance
rules. Such restrictions would come in the form of harsher limits on compensation,
“clawback” provisions for any bonus or incentive payments, wider golden parachute bans,
and broader publication requirements of expenditures that could be viewed as excessive or
luxury (UST PR, 02/04/2009). Treasury issued its final guidance on executive compensation
on June 10, 2009 (UST PR, 06/10/2009). See Key Design Decision No. 12 for more
information.

6 Redemption of preferred stock issued under the Capital

Purchase Program initially required it be done via the
proceeds of a Qualified Equity Offering, or a raising of additional preferred or common equity. This requirement
was removed after the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (CPP: FAQ
03/01/2012).
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Outcomes
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)
The SCAP was deliberately stringent. Estimates of potential losses for the 19 BHCs that
participated were $600 billion in the more adverse scenario. Three quarters of these losses
came from accrual loans, such as residential mortgages and consumer-related loans. Twoyear total loan-loss estimates were 9.1 percent, higher than any point in US history, including
during the height of the Great Depression (SCAP: Overview of Results). See Figure 2 for a
breakdown of historical two-year loan loss rates.
Figure 2: Historical two-year loan loss rates for commercial banks (%)
10
9

At 9.1%, SCAP two-year loan loss rates were
higher than peak levels during the Great
Depression.
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Sources: International Monetary Fund; Federal Reserve; FDIC.

The Federal Reserve pointed out that because of the two-year horizon of the SCAP, these
were not full lifetime losses. Approximately $400 billion in losses had already been realized
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by the 19 firms from the third quarter of 2007 to the end of 2008 (SCAP: Design and
Implementation). The Fed argued that the SCAP captured “a large portion of losses from
positions held as of the end of 2008”. Total loss-absorbing capacity for the 19 firms was about
$362.9 billion (SCAP: Overview of Results). The Fed measured loss-absorbing capacity by
looking at starting capital, adding any pre-provision net revenues over the period, and
subtracting the change in the allowance for loan losses.
The SCAP “capital buffer,” or the amount of capital needed to ensure that the participants
would be adequately capitalized under the more adverse scenario, came out to $185 billion
for 10 of the 19 BHCs. The other nine did not need additional capital.7 However, this figure
was based on the firms’ balance sheets as of December 31, 2008. It did not take into account
capital that firms raised at the end of 2008, as well as other actions many of the firms took
in early 2009 to pre-emptively strengthen their balance sheets prior to the release of the
stress test results. When accounting for these reductions, the Fed reduced its estimate of the
capital buffer from $185 billion to $75 billion. Most of the buffer needed was in the form of
common equity, reflecting the Fed’s desire to improve the composition of banks’ Tier 1
capital. Two banks were required to raise new Tier 1 capital: GMAC LLC ($9.1 billion) and
Regions Financial Corp. ($0.4 billion) (SCAP: Overview of Results).
After the Fed published the results of the SCAP, credit default swap (CDS) spreads for the
largest commercial and investment banks fell considerably. Citigroup’s CDS spread peaked
in April 2009 before falling nearly 300 basis points after the SCAP results were released.
Capital Assistance Program (CAP)
Treasury closed CAP on November 9, 2009, six months after the release of the SCAP results.
The Treasury made no investments under CAP. Nine of the 10institutions that failed the
stress test managed to raise capital from private sources (FRB PR, 11/09/2009). The only
institution that needed additional capital and failed to raise it on the market was GMAC. It
ultimately drew on capital from a different TARP program, the Automotive Industry
Financial Program (AIFP), on similar terms as it would have received under CAP. The
Treasury also converted existing GMAC preferred stock into mandatorily convertible
preferred stock and common equity to help GMAC cover its capital buffer needs (UST PR,
11/09/2009; GAO 10-861).
The other nine SCAP BHCs that failed the stress test were able to raise enough private capital
to satisfy their SCAP requirements within six months (FRB PR, 11/09/2009). One unique
feature of CAP was that institutions could apply at the end of the stress testing period to
ensure they would have access to the funds, but then defer funding for up to six months so
that the BHCs could attempt “to raise as much private capital as possible” (CAP: White
Paper). Most of the new capital was in the form of common equity, commensurate with the
SCAP recommendation to improve the quality of Tier 1 capital. Through new share issuance,
asset sales, and conversions of preferred equity into common equity, these firms raised $76.6

The nine firms that passed the stress test were American Express, BB&T, Bank of New York Mellon, Capital
One, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, MetLife, State Street, and US Bancorp (SCAP: Overview of Results – p. 9).
7
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billion in common equity in 2009 after the stress test results were released (GAO 10-861).
In total, SCAP BHCs increased their Tier 1 common equity by more than $200 billion from
December 31, 2008 to December 31, 2009.8
According to the Treasury, it did not receive any applications for CAP funding from firms that
did not participate in the SCAP (TARP Two-Year Retrospective).
All but one of the 19 SCAP institutions—MetLife—had issued a total of $216 billion in
preferred stock under the government’s Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) before the
SCAP exercise. Nine of these repaid approximately $66.7 billion in CPP investments on June
17, 2009, a little more than a month after the SCAP results had been released (CPP
Transaction Data).9 For a full accounting of capital actions from 2007 through 2010, see
Figure 3. For more information on private capital raises by individual SCAP banks after the
stress tests, see Figure 4.
Figure 3: SCAP Bank Capital Actions from Q1 2007 to Q4 2010 ($ billions)

Pre-TARP

TARP (14-Oct08)
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$45
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Source: Goldman Sachs.
Note: These calculations do not include capital raised by MetLife, Inc., or any conversions of preferred to common
equity. The $227 billion in TARP capital includes amounts raised under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and
Targeted Investment Program (TIP). The TARP figure also includes approximately $10.1 billion that Ally Financial
(GMAC) raised after the stress tests had been concluded.

This figure includes common equity raised and retained earnings.
The nine SCAP BHCs that repaid their CPP investments were Bank of New York Mellon ($3 billion), Goldman
Sachs ($10 billion), JP Morgan ($25 billion), Morgan Stanley ($10 billion), State Street ($2 billion), BB&T ($3.1
billion), Capital One ($3.6 billion), American Express ($3.4 billion), and US Bancorp ($6.6 billion).
8
9
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Figure 4: Post-SCAP Private Capital Raised by SCAP Banks (May 7, 2009 – December 31,
2009, $ billions)
Bank of America

$32.8

Citigroup

$25.4

Wells Fargo

$20.9

JPMorgan Chase

$9.8

MetLife

$7.4

Morgan Stanley

$6.9

PNC Financial Services

$4.1

U.S. Bancorp

$3.8

BB&T

$3.7

Capital One

$3.6

Bank of New York Mellon

$2.8

GMAC

$2.5

State Street

$2.3

Regions Financial

$2.1

SunTrust

$1.9

Key Corp

$1.0

Fifth Third Bank

$1.0

American Express
Goldman Sachs

Common Equity
Preferred Equity
Other Tier 1

$0.5
$0.0

$0.0

$5.0

$10.0

$15.0

$20.0
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Key Design Decisions

1. Part of a package: The SCAP and CAP were announced as part of the government’s
Financial Stability Plan, which also included an expansion of consumer and
business lending, a public-private investment fund, and housing support and
foreclosure prevention initiatives.
The Treasury released the Financial Stability Plan on February 10, 2009, to “address the
uncertainty, troubled assets and capital constraints of our financial institutions as well as the
frozen secondary markets that have been the source of around half of our lending for
everything from small business loans to auto loans” (UST PR, 02/10/2009). The plan had
several components:
(1) The Financial Stability Trust. The comprehensive stress test, which would later become
the SCAP, and the Capital Assistance Program (CAP) were core features of this piece of the
Plan. All investments made under CAP would have been placed into a separate Financial
Stability Trust, which was specifically designed to manage the government’s investments
(UST PR, 02/10/2009).
(2) Public-Private Investment Fund. This fund was designed to purchase legacy assets from
distressed institutions with the goal of soliciting private investors to co-invest with the
government. The Treasury aimed for it to include a public-private financing component of
$500 billion, with the potential to go up to $1 trillion, and private-sector pricing of assets;
however, it was marginally used and Treasury committed only about $18.6 billion to the
program, receiving a net positive return of about $3.9 billion (PPIP Quarterly Report:
September 2013; UST PR, 02/10/2009).
(3) Consumer & Business Lending Initiative. This was a joint venture of the Treasury and Fed
designed to unfreeze key secondary markets, specifically by expanding the capacity of the
not-yet-implemented Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). Treasury and the
Fed set the maximum size of TALF at $1 trillion; usage ultimately peaked at $49 billion
(FRBNY: TALF 101; UST PR, 02/10/2009).
(4) Transparency, Accountability, Monitoring, and Conditions. With this new plan, the
government expected recipients of aid to explain how they were going to use their funds and
how this new aid would impact their ability to lend. The plan also included limits on
executive compensation and on common stock dividends, repurchases, and cash mergers
(UST PR, 02/10/2009).
(5) Housing Support and Foreclosure Prevention. Treasury pledged $50 billion to help
middle-class homeowners reduce their monthly mortgage payments. Additionally, the
government committed to “establishing loan modification guidelines and standards for
government and private programs,” as well as mandating recipients to participate in
foreclosure mitigation plans (UST PR, 02/10/2009).
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(6) Small Business and Community Lending. Small Business Administration (SBA) lending,
which had declined by 57 percent from the first quarter of 2008, was addressed. The
administration’s Small Business and Community Bank Lending Initiative financed the
purchase of triple-A-rated SBA loans, increased the guarantee of said loans to 90 percent,
reduced SBA lending fees, and streamlined the application process to encourage lending
(UST PR, 02/10/2009).
The announcement of the plan was the first time the Treasury released details about SCAP
and CAP. It released the terms and conditions of the program on February 25 (UST PR,
02/10/2009; UST PR, 02/25/2009). The SCAP was widely publicized, with the goal of
reducing uncertainty and restoring confidence in the 19 BHCs that were tested. The CAP was
a government backstop to recapitalize BHCs if they were unable to raise funds on private
capital markets within six months (SCAP: Design and Implementation).
2. Legal authority: Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act on
October 3, 2008. EESA gave the Secretary of the Treasury authority to purchase
troubled assets “from any institution” and served as the legal basis for CAP.
Legal authority for the Capital Assistance Program came from Section 101 of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, which Congress passed on October 3, 2008.
Section 101 states that, “The [Secretary of the Treasury] is authorized to establish the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (or “TARP”) to purchase, and to make and fund commitments
to purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution…”(P.L. 110-343). The Treasury
and Federal Reserve ultimately decided to invest directly in the capital structure of banks
rather than purchase assets off their balance sheets. Its first TARP program was the Capital
Purchase Program, announced in October (SIGTARP 10/05/2009).
The Treasury later used this authority to make more targeted injections in AIG, Bank of
America, and Citigroup (SIGTARP 10/05/2009). This same authority formed the legal basis
for CAP in February. See Figure 5 for a comparison of capital instruments used in these two
facilities.
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Figure 5: Capital Design Elements of the Capital Purchase Program and the Capital
Assistance Program
Capital Purchase Program (CPP)

Capital Assistance Program (CAP)

Purpose

Encourage banks to accept government capital
to stabilize balance sheets and increase the flow
of financing to U.S. businesses and consumers

Incentivize banks to raise common equity through
the private sector and serve as a backstop for
government capital to help absorb larger than
expected future losses

Type

Preferred stock

Mandatorily convertible preferred stock

Term

Perpetual life

Mandatory conversion to common stock after 7
years. Optionally convertible by QFI or Treasury at
price equal to 90% of avg. common stock price in
20 trading days ending on February 9, 2009

Total size

$250 billion

Unlimited

Individual
participation
limits

Must issue an amount equal to not less than 1%
of RWA and not more than the lesser of $25
billion or 3% of RWA

Must issue an amount equal to not less than 1% of
RWA and not more than 2% of RWA

Dividends

5% for first five years

9% if shareholder consent received

9% after first five years

20% if consent not received

At par via proceeds of Qualified Equity Offering
during first 3 years

Only done via issuance of new common equity

Redemption

No restrictions after 3 years10

At par for first 2 years
Redeemable at greater of par and as-converted
value

Treasury voting Right to elect two directors if dividends are not
paid for six quarters
rights

Right to elect two directors if dividends are not
paid for six quarters

Warrants11

10 year

10 year

Purchase of common stock equal to 15% of
original gov’t investment amount

Purchase of common stock equal to 20% of original
gov’t investment amount

Reduced by half if QFI had repaid Treasury by
12/31/09.

Price reduced by 15% every six months (max of
45%) if shareholder consent not received

Price reduced by 15% every six months (max of
45%) if shareholder consent not received

10 A Qualified Equity Offering was the sale by the holder of CPP capital of common stock or “qualifying perpetual

preferred stock” for cash. This requirement was removed with the passage of ARRA in February 2009, and
redemptions could be done any time (CPP: Term Sheet; CPP: FAQ 03/01/2012).
11 “Shareholder consent,” in the context of this table, is defined as a pre-emptive vote undertaken by the
shareholders of a QFI after receiving either CPP or CAP assistance to authorize an additional amount of common
stock so that the exercise of the warrants and the conversion of the preferred equity (for CAP participants) can
be done. If this consent is not obtained, then the terms generally become harsher (CPP: Term Sheet – p. 5; CAP:
Term Sheet – p. 8).
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Executive
compensation

Applied to top 5 highest-paid executives
Limits on compensation; encouraged clawbacks
if bonuses/incentives were granted based on
materially inaccurate documents; prohibitions
of golden parachutes

Lawson

Applied to top 5 highest-paid executives and the
next 20 highest-paid employees
Bonus payments limited to one-third of total
compensation
Total annual compensation limited to $500,000
except in the case of restricted stock awards
Mandated clawback provisions. Required annual
shareholder vote to approve executive
compensation packages

Dividend
stoppers

No dividends, repurchases, or redemption of
common, junior preferred, or preferred shares
ranking pari-passu unless all dividends
(accrued and unpaid) for all past periods had
been paid.

No dividends, repurchases, or redemption of
common, junior preferred, or preferred shares
ranking pari-passu unless all dividends (accrued
and unpaid) for all past periods had been paid

Restriction on No specific requirements
use of proceeds

Institutions must submit a plan detailing how they
would use the additional capital to “preserve and
strengthen” their lending capacity

Usage

Not used

$205 billion to 707 banks and trusts
Sources: CPP: Term Sheet; CAP: Term Sheet: CAP.

3. Communication: The Treasury communicated that both the stress tests and
government backstop were key parts of its financial stability plan, citing their
desire to ensure the ability of institutions to continue lending at normal levels
even during a more severe economic decline.
In its February 10, 2009, press release, the Treasury said that the stress tests would identify
the capital buffer banks needed to remain well capitalized in an adverse scenario. It said it
would make government funds available through CAP to build that buffer. But it emphasized
that banks would “be encouraged to access private markets to raise any additional capital
needed to establish [the capital] buffer” rather than using CAP. Treasury framed CAP as a
temporary facility, “a bridge to private capital until market conditions normalized”. The
government capital instruments would be convertible to common equity “if needed to
preserve lending in a worse-than-expected economic environment”. The announcement also
stipulated that any investments made under CAP would be “placed in a separate entity set
up to manage the government’s investments in US financial institutions” (UST PR,
02/10/2009).
In its more detailed announcement on February 25, Treasury issued (1) a white paper
detailing the reasons for establishing such a facility as well as a broad overview of key
elements, (2) the official term sheet that bank holding companies would use to apply to the
program, and (3) a list of frequently asked questions (FAQs) to help increase understanding
of the program (UST PR, 02/25/2009). The Treasury expanded on its description of the
program on February 25 in a few distinct ways.
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The original plan did not specify what Treasury expected the banks that received CAP capital
to do with it, only stating that “the CAP instrument should improve confidence and increase
the willingness of financial institutions to lend”. In the February 25 release, however, the
expected usage was much clearer, with Treasury requiring any applicant to “submit a plan
for how they intend to use this capital to preserve and strengthen their lending capacity”.
Specifically, Treasury desired applicants to increase their lending relative to what they
would have been able to do without government capital. These plans would be made public
by Treasury once government equity under the CAP had been obtained (UST PR,
02/25/2009).
The “separate entity” that would hold the government’s investments was further explained
in the white paper that Treasury released. Treasury stated that all investments made under
CAP would be put in a separate trust that would manage the government’s investments, and
that the trustees’ primary objective was to “protect and create value for the taxpayer as a
shareholder over time”. This was done to reinforce Treasury’s goal of keeping any period of
government investment “as temporary as possible” (CAP: White Paper).
The names of applicants would not be published. However, for any completed transactions,
the name of the bank and the amount invested would be published within 48 hours of the
investment. Applicants could request portions of the application be treated confidentially if
they could “specifically demonstrate the harm (for example, loss of competitive position,
invasion of privacy) that would result from public release of information” (CAP: FAQ).
In the case of the SCAP, the Federal Reserve released a detailed report to the public on April
24, 2009, on the design of the stress test. The Fed said the purpose of the report was to “assist
analysts and other interested members of the public in understanding the results of the
[SCAP]” (FRB PR, 04/24/2009). This report was released shortly after the test had
concluded, and the results were released on May 7 (SCAP: Overview of Results).
In a speech on May 11, 2009, at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Fed chairman Ben
Bernanke stated that all agencies involved aimed to be as transparent as possible (Bernanke,
05/11/2009). There was, however, much internal debate among officials about how
transparent the government ought to be about communicating the results of the stress tests.
While there were regulators that wished to make many details of the tests public, doing so
“ran counter to decades of a banking supervision philosophy that extolled the virtues of
confidentiality”. Some regulators believed that too much transparency could be destabilizing
by singling out “weaker” banks, which could lead to the very bank runs the SCAP was trying
to prevent. In the end, the Federal Reserve agreed to a policy of transparency so the public
could “decide for themselves [if the] stress test was sufficiently rigorous and credible (Clark,
Kabaker, and Sachs 2020).
On May 6, the day before the official release, the Fed, Treasury, FDIC, and OCC released a joint
statement that previewed the SCAP results. The agencies explained that the tests were not
only about the quantity of Tier 1 capital but its quality (FRB PR, 05/06/2009). The SCAP,
they said, was “by design” more stringent than a traditional solvency test (SCAP: Overview
of Results). As a result, any additional capital that the BHCs would need as a result of the
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tests did not indicate inadequate capitalization, but was to provide an additional buffer in
the event that a more pronounced recession occurred (FRB PR, 05/06/2009). The
government also explained that any BHCs that needed additional capital would be required
to submit a capital raising plan and would have six months to implement it (SCAP: Overview
of Results).
After the release of the SCAP results on May 7, CDS spreads for the six major bank holding
companies, as well as the Libor-OIS spread, fell dramatically. Several of the largest
Figure 6: Five-Year CDS Spreads for Six Large Bank Holding Companies (basis points)
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participants in the Capital Purchase Program were also able to repay the government’s
investment in June. See Key Design Decision No. 7 for more details on the impacts of the
SCAP, and Figure 6 for historical bank CDS spreads during this time.
Investors remained concerned about bank solvency in early 2009, despite the extraordinary
efforts prior to the SCAP by the FDIC, Treasury, and Fed to recapitalize banks and restore
confidence. The focus of those concerns had shifted. While banks’ early losses during the
financial crisis had resulted largely from exposures to subprime mortgages and complex
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credit products, the concerns in 2009 largely stemmed from more traditional credit risks,
such as “rising delinquencies on prime as well as subprime mortgages, unpaid credit card
and auto loans, worsening conditions in commercial real estate markets, and increased rates
of corporate bankruptcy”. According to Bernanke, the SCAP was designed to measure the
impact of high expected loan loss rates and to address the uncertainty around the extent of
these expected loss rates in the event of more adverse economic conditions (Bernanke,
5/11/2009).
4. Governance: Section 104 of EESA established the Financial Stability Oversight
Board (FSOB), which monitored the activities of the CAP and other TARP
programs; the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), which provided public
accountability for Treasury’s use of TARP authority; and the Special Inspector
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), which was the principal
oversight authority.
Section 104 of EESA established the Financial Stability Oversight Board (FSOB) to review the
policies implemented under section 101. These policies included reviewing “the
appointment of financial agents, the designation of asset classes to be purchased, and plans
for the structure of vehicles used to purchase troubled assets”. The FSOB was also
responsible for examining the effects that programs made under Section 101 had on
“assisting American families in preserving home ownership, stabilizing financial markets,
and protecting taxpayers” (P.L. 110-343).
The Board had the following members:
(1) The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(2) The Secretary of the Treasury
(3) The Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)
(4) The Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and
(5) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Additionally, the Board was required to report to Congress and the Congressional Oversight
Panel (COP) at least quarterly to discuss the matters described above (P.L. 110-343).
The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or SIGTARP, was
established through Section 121 of EESA. The Special Inspector General was to be appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and was responsible for “coordinat[ing] audits
and investigations of the purchase, management, and sale of assets by the Secretary of the
Treasury . . .” (P.L. 110-343). SIGTARP did this by collecting the following information from
the Treasury:
(1) Descriptions of categories of troubled assets purchased.
(2) Listings of assets that fell into the aforementioned categories.
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(3) Explanations of the reasons for purchasing said assets.
(4) Listings of the financial institutions that the troubled assets were purchased from.
(5) Detailed biographical information about the people hired to manage these troubled
assets.
(6) Estimates on the total number and value of troubled assets, how much remained with
the Treasury, how much had been sold, and the profit or loss incurred from said sales
(P.L. 110-343).
According to its mission statement, SIGTARP “is a federal law enforcement agency and is an
independent watchdog protecting taxpayer dollars that fund TARP” (SIGTARP Annual
Report – FY 2018). SIGTARP reported to Congress about its supervisory activities twice a
year, audited various TARP programs, and conducted and reported on investigations of
misconduct for TARP recipients (SIGTARP – Official Website). SIGTARP’s quarterly reports
generally consisted of assessments of various components of the program, such as the CPP,
as well auto and housing industry support programs (SIGTARP April 2010). SIGTARP reports
included detailed recommendation sections, informed by the audits and investigations it
conducted, and also provided detailed tables of the implementation status of each of these
recommendations (SIGTARP July 2014).
The COP was another crucial component of TARP oversight. Created on the same day that
TARP was passed, COP’s primary functions were to:
(1) Oversee Treasury’s actions;
(2) Assess the impact of spending to stabilize the economy;
(3) Evaluate market transparency;
(4) Ensure effective foreclosure mitigation efforts; and
(5) Guarantee that Treasury’s actions are in the best interest of the American people
(COP – About Us).
In its approximately two and a half years of operation, the COP heard testimony from highlevel officials and published 30 reports on the impacts of TARP initiatives. The Panel asked
questions about the more immediate, stabilizing effects of TARP, as well as longer-term
impacts, such as how TARP recipients were structuring their business and policies after
receiving aid (COP December 2008). Its reports examined, for example, the government
support to specific firms like GMAC and AIG and the effectiveness of the SCAP stress testing
methodology (COP – Reports).
The COP was disbanded on April 3, 2011, after releasing its final report. In it, the Panel
explained that, while TARP alone was not responsible for the economic recovery, “TARP
quelled the immediate panic and helped to avert an even more severe crisis” (COP March
2011). This final report had few comments on SCAP and CAP.

915

Lawson

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 3

Program Size: CAP was intended to be an unlimited capital backstop; it had a total capacity
of roughly $300 billion. CAP was intended to be an unlimited capital backstop for the
financial sector (Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020; UST PR, 02/10/2009). The program was
estimated to have a total capacity of roughly $300 billion, which officials believed was
sufficient to meet any potential needs (see Funding Source KDD).
5. Size, Funding Source: CAP was funded via Congressional appropriations
authorized for Treasury’s use under the Troubled Assets Relief Program.
Congress authorized a total of $700 billion of TARP funds that could be “outstanding at any
one time.” However, Congress originally allowed only $250 billion to be outstanding; it
required the president to return to Congress with a report asking to disburse the remaining
funds, should they be necessary (P.L. 110-343).12 This authority lasted until October 3, 2010,
or two years after the date of the passage of EESA. After this point, Treasury was not able to
make new commitments under TARP (TARP Two-Year Retrospective). The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed on July 21, 2010, reduced this original
commitment from $700 billion to $475 billion (P.L. 111-203). See Key Design Decision No.
15 for more information on Dodd-Frank.
However, the unlimited nature of CAP meant there was some uncertainty around how much,
if any, capital the government would need to provide. Fed and Treasury officials, in a paper
published later, estimated that the program had a total capacity of roughly $300 billion. That
sum included about $100 billion in appropriated but still uncommitted TARP funds, plus the
roughly $200 billion in existing CPP preferred shares that the Treasury could convert into
new CAP preferred shares if needed (Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020).
In hindsight, those officials wrote, the level that the government had committed “was
sobering—we were committing the government to buy an indeterminate amount of common
stock in the banking system at a fixed price” (Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020). However,
even the most extreme scenarios under SCAP determined the capital buffer to be far less
than the remaining amount of TARP funds available. TARP would have had sufficient funds
to cover the entire $185 billion capital buffer that SCAP had identified if the 10 BHCs that
failed the stress test had been unable to raise funds from other sources.13 However, it was
not known at the time how much TARP money would be available to finance the SCAP buffer,
as many of the programs were still being developed and funds had been committed to other
programs.
6. SCAP-eligible institutions: Federal banking regulators required all bank holding
companies with risk-weighted assets of more than $100 billion to perform

The phrase “outstanding at any one time,” which implicitly allowed the government to re-use TARP funds,
was removed with the passage of Dodd-Frank in July 2010.
13 Total disbursements under TARP were approximately $441.8 billion, which was far less than the initial $700
billion appropriated in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (TARP Tracker).
12
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forward-looking “stress-tests” under the Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program to determine their capital needs.
The US government assessed the capital needs of the banking system through the
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program, a forward-looking stress test of the 19 largest
BHCs under a set of stringent economic scenarios. Each of the BHCs had risk-weighted assets
of more than $100 billion.14 These firms were picked because of their significance in the
credit intermediation process, the fact that they collectively held “two-thirds of the assets
and more than one-half of the loans in the US banking system”, and in the case of State Street
and Bank of New York Mellon, their significance as the two largest custody banks. Teams of
examiners, led by those at the Federal Reserve, “appl[ied] a consistent and systematic
approach across the group to evaluate the projected loss and resource estimates submitted
by the firms” (SCAP: Design and Implementation).
The SCAP was deliberately stringent. This allowed the Fed to “[counter] the risk that
uncertainty itself exerts contractionary pressures on the banking system and the economy”
(SCAP: Overview of Results). The goal of the tests was to ensure that, even in the event of a
significant deterioration in the US economy, these critically important BHCs would remain
adequately capitalized and able to lend at their normal levels (FRB PR, 05/06/2009). In
order to assess these needs, federal regulators estimated losses on a variety of securities and
loans for 2009 and 2010. It also calculated loan loss reserves at the end of 2010 at levels that
the regulators believed would “captur[e] expected losses in 2011” (SCAP: Design and
Implementation).
The Federal Reserve crafted two economic scenarios, the “baseline” and “more adverse”
scenarios. In both cases, the Fed projected changes in real GDP, the civilian unemployment
rate, and house prices over 2009–10. “The baseline scenario was intended to represent a
consensus view about the depth and duration of the recession,” and was based on the
average of economic projections published by the February releases of forecasts from three
major economic forecasting surveys: Consensus Forecasts, the Blue Chip survey, and the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SCAP: Design and Implementation).15
The more adverse scenario did not average the consensus expectations of a variety of
forecasters. Rather, it “was constructed from the historical track record of private
forecasters as well as their current assessments of uncertainty”. The Fed focused specifically
on “subjective probability assessments” from these organizations to gauge the probability
that the aforementioned inputs (GDP growth, unemployment, house prices) would be even
more affected than the general consensus used in the baseline scenario. Despite the dramatic
differences from the baseline, the more adverse scenario was not a “worst-case” scenario, as
the Fed argued that the conditions of the stress test ought to be “severe but plausible” (SCAP:

Despite this being one of the criteria for BHCs under SCAP, one of the firms—State Street—had only $69.6
billion in risk-weighted assets. See Table 1 for more information on SCAP BHCs.
15 House prices were measured by the fourth-quarter year-over-year change of the Case-Shiller 10-City
Composite Index (SCAP: Design and Implementation – p. 6).
14
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Design and Implementation). See Figure 7 for the estimates associated with the baseline and
more adverse scenarios.
Figure 7: SCAP Baseline and More Adverse Economic Scenarios (percent)
Real GDP

2008 – 2009

2009 – 2010

Average baseline

–2.0

2.1

More adverse

–3.3

0.5

Average baseline

8.4

8.8

More adverse

8.9

10.3

Baseline

–14

–4

More adverse

–22

–7

Civilian unemployment rate

House prices

Source: SCAP: Design and Implementation – p. 6.

The BHCs were instructed to estimate losses that were due to failure to pay obligations
rather than those due to mark-to-market accounting (SCAP: Design and Implementation).
This judgment was based on what some Treasury officials at the time called the theory of
special bank relativity. This theory pushed back on the general standard of mark-to-market
accounting by suggesting that banks exist through time and shouldn’t be judged based on
how they stand during the lowest point in a cycle. Forcing the banks to do this, some argued,
would “undermine a key reason [why] they are so important for supporting economic
activity in the first place” (Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020).
Each BHC was “asked to estimate their potential losses on loans, securities, and trading
positions, as well as pre-provision net revenue (PPNR) and the resources available from the
allowance for loan and lease losses”. BHCs with large enough trading accounts ($100 billion
in assets or more) were required to provide additional loss estimates in the adverse scenario
that factored in counterparty credit risk.16 BHCs calculated these loss estimates on their

16 Counterparty credit risk

was measured by assessing the risk of a counterparty defaulting, as well as potential
credit valuation adjustments that would be made against exposures to counterparties who were more likely to
default under the more adverse scenario.
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trading books and counterparty exposures using internal stress tests based on market prices
on February 20, 2009 (SCAP: Design and Implementation).
Banks projected losses over two years. The Federal Bank of New York (FRBNY) provided loss
ranges for 12 different types of loans and securities, such as first- and second-lien mortgages,
commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, and credit card loans. Banks could provide
alternative loss estimates from what FRBNY gave them, but they were then required to
provide “strong supporting evidence, especially if they fell below the range minimum”. To
ensure more accuracy, the BHCs were encouraged to provide additional information, such as
loss projections on subcategories within the 12 that the Fed selected. The categories of loans
were chosen to make the results easier to compare across firms and to compare with what
the BHCs had filed with their federal regulator (SCAP: Design and Implementation). The
categories of loans, as well as some of the variables that the examiners used when conducting
the evaluations, can be found in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Description of SCAP Loan Types and Variables Evaluated by Assessors
Loans

Variables evaluated

First-lien mortgages

(1) Type of product

Prime

(2) Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio

Alt-A

(3) FICO score

Subprime

(4) Geography
(5) Level of documentation

Second-/Junior-lien mortgages

(6) Year of origination

Closed-end junior liens

(7) Other variables

HELOCs
C&I loans

(1) Distribution of exposures, by industry
(2) Internal ratings provided by the BHCs
(3) Expected default rates from third parties

CRE loans

(1) Property type

Construction

(2) Loan-to-value (LTV) ratio

Multifamily

(3) Debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)

Nonfarm, Non-residential

(4) Geography
(5) Loan maturity

Credit cards

(1) FICO score
(2) Payment and utilization rates
(3) Geographic concentration

Other consumer

(1) FICO score
(2) Loan-to value (LTV) ratio
(3) Term and vehicle age
(4) Geographic concentration

Other loans

(1) Loss record over the previous 5 years

Source: SCAP: Design and Implementation - pp. 12 - 13, 18.
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Estimated loss rates were calculated using a variety of methods. For residential mortgages,
for example, the agencies built default models based on information about individual and
regional loan portfolios and mortgages. For other consumer loans and commercial loans, the
agencies conducted regressions of historical default data against several macroeconomic
variables, such as the unemployment rate. The regulators also had to address the
heterogeneity across firms that would affect their performance in these tests. To this end,
they collected additional firm-specific data, such as “past performance, portfolio
composition, origination vintage, borrower characteristics, geographic distribution,
international operations, and business mix” (SCAP: Design and Implementation). Cumulative
loan-loss rates under the more adverse scenario were 9.1 percent, which was higher than
the banking industry had ever experienced, even at the height of the Great Depression (SCAP:
Overview of Results). Figure 9 compares the loan-loss rates under the baseline and more
adverse scenarios to the actual loss rates the industry experienced in 2009.
Figure 9: Two-Year Loss Rates for SCAP Scenarios and 2009 Actual Loss Rates
(percent)
SCAP Loss range Estimates

2009 Actual Loss Rates

Assets

Baseline

More adverse

SCAP BHC avg.

Industry avg.

First-lien mortgages

5–6

7 – 8.5

1.9

1.7

Prime

1.5 – 2.5

3–4

N/A

0.5

Alt-A

7.5 – 9.5

9.5 – 13

N/A

3.6

Subprime

15 – 20

21 – 28

N/A

6.2

Second-/Junior-Lien
Mortgages

9 – 12

12 – 16

4.4

3.9

Closed-end junior liens

18 – 20

22 – 25

7.5

6.6

HELOCs

6–8

8 – 11

3.6

3.1

C&I loans

3–4

5–8

2.5

2.3

CRE

5 – 7.5

9 – 12

2.3

2.4

Construction

8 – 12

15 – 18

5.8

6.1

Multifamily

3.5 – 6.5

10 – 11

1.1

1.1

Nonfarm, non-residential

4–5

7–9

0.9

0.8

Credit cards

12 – 17

18 – 20

10.1

10.2

Other consumer

4–6

8 – 12

4.1

4.4

Other loans

2-4

4 - 10

1.4

1.1

Sources: SCAP: Overview of Results – p. 5; GAO 10-861 – p. 17.
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BHCs were also required to provide projections of their resources to absorb losses, including
their pre-provision net revenues (PPNR) and their allowance for loan losses over the same
horizon. In the case of SCAP, PPNR was defined as “the income after non-credit-related
expenses that would flow into firms before they take provisions or other write-downs or
losses” (SCAP: Design and Implementation; FRB: Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses). All
told, more than 150 federal employees were involved in the creation, organization, and
administration of the SCAP (SCAP: Design and Implementation).
When determining a BHC’s capital needs, the regulators looked at both the amount of Tier 1
capital and its composition.17 Tier 1 common equity, the first element of Tier 1 capital to
absorb losses, was seen by the Fed as what should be “the dominant component” of Tier 1
capital (SCAP: Design and Implementation). Common equity “gives a BHC greater permanent
loss absorption capacity and a greater ability to conserve resources under stress by changing
the amount and timing of dividends and other distributions” (SCAP: Overview of Results).
The Fed considered two key questions when evaluating the capital needs of each of the BHCs
under the more adverse scenario:
(1) How much additional Tier 1 capital would a BHC need today to have a Tier 1 ratio of
greater than 6 percent at the end of 2010?
(2) How much additional Tier 1 common equity capital would a BHC need today to have
a Tier 1 common equity ratio of greater than 4 percent at the end of 2010?
These capital thresholds were known as the “6-4 rule.” The regulators used them to
determine the SCAP buffer—the amount of additional capital the 19 BHCs needed to remain
well-capitalized even under the more adverse scenario. Nine firms already met the 6-4 rule.
The other 10 firms needed a total of $185 billion in additional capital to meet the rule. Their
SCAP buffer needs ranged from as high as $92.6 billion for Citigroup and as low as $2.3 billion
for PNC. Most of the SCAP buffer needs were due to insufficient common equity. Tier 1 capital
numbers for most banks were within acceptable limits under the more adverse scenario.
Only two banks—GMAC LLC and Regions Financial Corp.—had insufficient Tier 1 capital.
Due to the emphasis on common equity, the Fed concluded that the 10 firms that needed to
raise additional equity “had capital structures that [were] too strongly tilted toward capital
other than common equity” (SCAP: Overview of Results).
However, the $185 billion figure did not consider capital that firms had raised at the end of
2008, as well as other actions many of the firms had taken to pre-emptively shore up their
balance sheets prior to the release of the results. The most noteworthy of these was
Citigroup, which reduced its SCAP buffer by $87.1 billion through preferred stock exchanges

Tier 1 capital is composed of qualifying common stockholders’ equity, qualifying noncumulative perpetual
preferred stock and senior perpetual preferred stock issued to the Treasury under TARP, certain minority
interests and trust preferred securities (SCAP: Design and Implementation).
17
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and other actions.18 Other banks increased their equity in this period by lesser amounts. By
the time the results had been released, the original $185 billion, which was based on the
firms’ balance sheets as of December 31, 2008, had been reduced to $74.6 billion (SCAP:
Overview of Results). See Figure 10 for the adjusted SCAP requirements of the 10 firms.
BHCs that had SCAP buffer needs were required to submit capital plans to their primary
regulator within 30 days. BHCs would have six months to implement these plans and were
Figure 10: SCAP Capital Shortfalls ($ billions)
Bank of America

33.9

Wells Fargo

13.7

GMAC

11.5

Citigroup

5.5

Regions Financial

2.5

SunTrust Banks

2.2

Morgan Stanley

1.8

Key Corp

1.8

Fifth Third Bank

1.1

PNC Financial Services

0.6

0

10

20

30

40

Source: SCAP: Overview of Result.

“encouraged to design capital plans that, wherever possible, actively seek to raise new
capital from private sources” (SCAP: Overview of Results).
The 10 BHCs managed to raise $76.6 billion in Tier 1 common equity by November 9, the end
of the six-month deadline (FRB PR, 11/09/2009). The only institution that needed additional
capital and failed to raise it from private investors was GMAC. It ultimately used the

Citi announced a plan to convert up to $27.5 billion of its existing preferred stock into common stock on
February 27, 2009, as well as an agreement with the US government wherein Treasury would match this
exchange at up to $25 billion of its own preferred stock. By the time the offers closed at the end of July 2009,
Citi had raised approximately $58 billion in capital (Citi PR, 02/27/2009; Citi PR, 07/26/2009; SCAP: Overview
of Results). Additional capital actions, characterized as those transactions that were completed or contracted
as of the end of 2008, amounted to $29 billion (SCAP: Overview of Results).
18
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Automotive Industry Financial Program (AIFP) to help meet the SCAP requirements (UST
PR, 11/09/2009).
As a result, no SCAP BHCs drew on the CAP for government capital. See Figure 11 for a
breakdown of the Tier 1 ratios of the SCAP BHCs at the end of 2009.
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Figure 11: Change in Tier 1 Capital Ratios for SCAP Banks, December 31, 2008 to
December 31, 2009
Tier 1 common capital ratio

Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio

Bank holding company

2009 (%)

Change
from 2009 (%)
2008 (bps)

Change from
2008 (bps)

American Express

9.83

13

9.84

14

Bank of America

7.82

322

10.41

–19

BB&T

8.50

140

11.48

–82

York 10.53

103

12.12

–118

Capital One

10.62

152

13.75

105

Citigroup

9.77

747

11.67

–23

Fifth Third

7.00

260

13.31

271

GMAC

4.85

–155

14.15

405

Goldman Sachs

12.20

450

14.97

237

JPMorgan Chase

8.79

229

11.10

90

KeyCorp

7.50

190

12.75

185

MetLife

8.17

–33

8.91

–29

Morgan Stanley

6.71

101

15.30

10

PNC

6.00

130

11.42

182

Regions

7.15

55

11.54

114

State Street

15.59

9

17.74

–246

SunTrust

7.67

187

12.96

206

US Bancorp

6.76

166

9.61

–99

Wells Fargo

6.46

336

9.25

125

Weighted average

8.31

303

11.31

60

Bank of
Mellon

New

Source: GAO 10-861.
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7. CAP-eligible institutions: Publicly traded bank holding companies, financial
holding companies, insured depository institutions, and savings and loan holding
companies were eligible for CAP.
BHCs that had SCAP buffer needs were required to submit capital plans to their primary
regulator within 30 days. BHCs would have six months to implement these plans and were
“encouraged to design capital plans that, wherever possible, actively seek to raise new
capital from private sources”. These could include “restructuring current capital
instruments, sales of assets, and restrictions on dividends and stock repurchases” (SCAP:
Overview of Results). The plans normally had the following elements:
(1) A description of the specific actions the institution would take to increase the level
or quality of its capital consistent with the results of the SCAP.
(2) A list of steps to address any weaknesses for the BHC’s internal evaluations of its
capital needs and capital planning.
(3) An outline of the steps the BHC was planning to take to repay all government
investments received, as well as to reduce reliance on guaranteed debt issued under
the FDIC guarantee program (FSOB Report, 06/30/2009).
BHCs with SCAP buffer needs were able to apply to the CAP but defer issuing convertible
preferred stock to the government via the facility for up to six months while they searched
for private capital (CAP: White Paper).
Qualifying financial institutions (QFIs) that did not participate in SCAP were eligible to apply
voluntarily. They had until May 25, 2009, to apply, though any company applying to become
a bank holding company had to do so by January 15, 2009, to be eligible for CAP (CAP: FAQ).
QFIs included any publicly traded US bank or savings association not controlled by a bank
holding company or a savings and loan company, top-tier US bank holding companies, and
top-tier US savings and loan companies that “[engaged] solely and predominately in
activities that are permitted for financial holding companies under relevant law”. Banks or
BHCs that were foreign-owned, or subsidiaries of foreign companies, were not allowed to
participate. While the term sheet stated that CAP term sheets for privately held banks, Scorporations, and mutual banks were “expected to be made available,” they never were (CAP:
Term Sheet).
8. Individual Participation Limits: CAP specified minimum and maximum
interventions for individual participating institutions.
An institution that was accepted into the program could issue mandatorily convertible
preferred stock in an amount no less than 1% of its risk-weighted assets, up to a maximum
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of 2%.19 It could submit a request for capital in excess of this amount to its federal banking
regulator, who would then consult with Treasury. If this was successful, the institution would
be categorized as needing “exceptional assistance” and would potentially be subject to
additional terms and conditions (CAP: Term Sheet).
9. Capital Characteristics: Institutions participating in the program would issue
Mandatorily Convertible Preferred Shares, with a mandatory conversion to
common equity after seven years if the capital had not been repaid.
Under CAP, the Treasury would purchase mandatorily convertible preferred shares,
henceforth referred to as Convertible Preferred, in QFIs. Cash received from the issuance of
these shares could be used to redeem shares under other government investment programs,
such as the Capital Purchase Program or the Targeted Investment Program (CAP: Term
Sheet). Also, government investments made under these programs could be converted into
Convertible Preferred. While the Treasury would make all investments under CAP, the
investments themselves would be managed by a trust set up “to protect and create value for
the taxpayer as a shareholder over time” (CAP: White Paper).
Stockholder Consent
After issuing the Convertible Preferred, QFIs that did not have enough common stock
authorized to reserve for the conversion and exercise of the warrants were required to call
a shareholder vote to authorize an increase of the number of common shares so that the
conversion and exercise could take place if needed. The terms of the capital could change in
several ways (see below) if this authorization was not obtained in a timely manner or at all
(CAP: Term Sheet).
Conversion
The Convertible Preferred had both mandatory and optional conversion clauses as part of
its structure. The optional conversion gave the issuer of the equity the right to convert any
amount of the preferred equity to common stock at any time, subject to regulatory approval.
The holder of the Convertible Preferred, in this case the Trust created by Treasury, could also
convert the shares “upon specified corporate events, including certain sales, mergers or
changes of control of the QFI”. If a QFI held the Convertible Preferred for longer than seven
years, the shares would automatically convert to common stock (CAP: Term Sheet). The price
for conversion was unspecified in the initial Financial Stability Plan. The Treasury said then
that the price would be “set at a modest discount from the prevailing level of the institution’s
stock price as of February 9, 2009” (UST PR, 02/10/2009). The term sheet further explained
that the price would be set at 90 percent of the average of the closing price of the QFI’s
common stock over the 20 trading day period ending on February 9, 2009. This price,
however, would be reduced by 15 percent every six months after the initial injection if the
aforementioned stockholder vote to increase the number of common shares did not happen,
This was in addition to other Convertible Preferred stock that was to be used to redeem shares under either
CPP, TIP, or both.
19
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to a maximum of 45 percent. Conversion would be accompanied by the repayment of any
accrued or unpaid dividends, either with cash or common stock (CAP: Term Sheet).20
Mandatory Sale
After the mandatory conversion date, the Treasury was required to “make reasonable
efforts” to sell at least 20 percent of its outstanding common stock annually. At any point
after either a mandatory or optional conversion, the QFI had the option to repurchase the
common stock held by the government by issuing new common stock or drawing on retained
earnings. The price of repurchase was the greater of:
(1) The conversion price.
(2) The market price, calculated based on the average closing price during the 20
trading day period following the notice of repurchase (CAP: Term Sheet).
The Treasury made it clear that, despite the potential for the government to acquire a large
interest in an institution, “US government ownership is not an objective of the CAP” (FSOB
Report, 03/31/2009). The mandatory sale clause in the term sheet reflected the intention of
the Treasury to keep the period of government investment “as temporary as possible” (CAP:
White Paper).
Dividends.
The Convertible Preferred paid cumulative dividends of 9 percent, which compounded
quarterly. This rate would increase to, and remain at, 20 percent six months after the original
issue date if stockholder consent was not given. So long as any Convertible Preferred or
Treasury-owned common stock remained outstanding, the dividends on any common stock
not held by Treasury could not be greater than $0.01 per share. An additional “dividend
stopper” was included in the term sheet. The stopper prevented QFIs from declaring or
paying dividends on any shares, whether they were pari passu preferred, junior preferred,
or common, if any dividends on the Convertible Preferred remained outstanding (CAP: Term
Sheet).
Repurchases
Repurchases of other securities, such as junior preferred, pari passu preferred shares, or
common shares, were affected by the “dividend stopper” and thus prohibited if any
dividends on the Convertible Preferred remained outstanding (CAP: Term Sheet).

If common shares were used to repay accrued and unpaid dividends, they would be valued “at the closing
price on the second preceding trading day” (CAP: Term Sheet – p. 3).
20
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Warrants
The Convertible Preferred also included 10-year warrants. These warrants, which were
immediately exercisable, allowed the Treasury to purchase common stock equal to 20
percent of the amount of Convertible Preferred on the day of initial investment. The price to
exercise the warrants was the same as the conversion price. The exercise price would also
be reduced in 15 percent increments every six months after the initial injection, to a
maximum of 45 percent if shareholder consent is not gained. While the Treasury would gain
a larger voting interest in the QFI after exercising the warrants, it pledged not to exercise any
voting
power
with
respect
to
these
shares
(CAP:
Term
Sheet).
Redemption
QFIs were able to redeem the Convertible Preferred “at any time solely with the proceeds of
one or more issuances of common stock for cash,” so long as they (1) obtained approval from
their federal banking regulator, and (2) the proceeds of the equity issuances equaled at least
25 percent of the issue price of the Convertible Preferred. Redemption was done either at
par value (plus accrued and unpaid dividends) if done within the first two years, and at the
greater of par value plus accrued and unpaid dividends and the as-converted value if done
after two years (CAP: Term Sheet).
This meant that QFIs that issued Convertible Preferred had an implicit time limit on
redeeming the shares because, after two years, the cost of redemption could increase
dramatically if the QFI’s stock price had increased. The as-converted value of the preferred
investment would become greater than the par value of the investment, and the QFI would
have to choose between raising enough common equity to satisfy this increased redemption
price, continue to pay 9 percent in dividends on the preferred, or convert it to common stock.
As noted, repurchases of converted stock could be done by issuing new common equity or
drawing on retained earnings (CAP: Term Sheet).
10. Loss-sharing: Banks that failed the stress test were required to impose losses on
existing stakeholders through dilution or debt-for-equity conversions. However,
Treasury did not provide guidelines describing how banks should do this.
The Treasury expected institutions with SCAP capital buffer needs to design their own
private-sector solution to increase their capital, with CAP funding available as a last resort.
These solutions could include a mix of debt and preferred equity conversions, asset sales,
and other measures. However, the Treasury did not provide any guidelines for these
solutions. In a joint statement the day before they released the SCAP results, the Fed,
Treasury, FDIC, and OCC said that “restructuring current capital instruments” was one of the
ways that SCAP BHCs could meet their capital needs (FRB PR, 05/06/2009). Treasury
officials internally called the program akin to “open bank resolution.” In a typical open bank
resolution, existing common equity holders see the value of their shares diluted, in whole or
in part; and existing preferred equity and debt investors accept losses or convert their
holdings into common equity.
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Converting junior debtholders to common equity holders through debt-for-equity exchanges
and other tools “was the preferred path before [the BHCs] sought government capital”. Later,
Treasury officials said they meant to make clear to junior debtholders that they “should
expect to bear losses” (Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020).
The SCAP BHCs already had about $300 billion in debt outstanding through these
instruments, which suggested to regulators that they could meet their SCAP buffer needs
without finding new equity investors (Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020). Figure 12 below
illustrates the capital actions taken by SCAP banks.
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Figure 12: Description of Capital Actions by SCAP Bank Holding Companies
(billions)21
SCAP BHC

Source(s) of capital raised

Required
SCAP Capital
capital Buffer
raised22

New shares, asset sales, and share

$33.9

$35.9

Share conversion

$5.5

$5.6

New shares, asset sales, and share
conversion

$1.1

$1.7

New shares

$11.5

$4.6

KeyCorp

New shares, asset sales, and share
conversion

$1.8

$2.3

Morgan Stanley

New shares, asset sales, and share
conversion

$1.8

$7.0

New shares and asset sales

$0.6

$1.1

New shares, asset sales, share

$2.5

$2.5

$2.2

$2.2

Bank
of
Corporation

America conversion23

Citigroup, Inc.
Fifth Third Bancorp
GMAC LLC

PNC Financial Services
Group, Inc.
Regions
Corporation

Financial conversion, and internal equity

SunTrust Banks, Inc.

raising24
New shares, asset sales, share
conversion, and internal equity
raising

Nine BHCs—American Express Company, BB&T Corporation, Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, Capital
One Financial Corporation, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., MetLife, Inc., State Street
Corporation, and US Bancorp—were not required to raise SCAP capital because they had sufficient capital to
withstand a worse-than-expected economic downturn through the end of 2010 and continue to meet the SCAP
capital buffer targets.
22 As of November 9, 2009, according to the Federal Reserve.
23 “New shares” indicates that a BHC issued new common equity, “assets sales” represent business lines or
products sold to raise cash, and “conversion” shows BHC preferred equity that was converted to common
equity.
24 “Internal equity raising” included actions such as sales of equity to employee stock options plans.
21
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New shares and internal equity

Wells Fargo & Company raising
Total

$13.7

$13.7

$74.6

$76.6

Source: GAO Report 10-861.

11. Control over management: The Treasury’s shares did not have voting rights;
however, it had the ability to appoint two directors to the boards of institutions
that did not pay interest or dividends for six quarters.
If dividends on the Convertible Preferred stock were not paid for six quarters, consecutive
or not, then Treasury would have the ability to elect two directors to the board. This right
ended after dividends had been paid for four consecutive quarters (CAP: Term Sheet).
Treasury would exercise the voting rights under the Convertible Preferred only in the cases
of:
(1) an authorization or issuance of shares senior to the Convertible Preferred
(2) any amendment to the rights of the Convertible Preferred, or
(3) any merger, exchange or similar transaction which would adversely affect the rights
of the Convertible Preferred (CAP: Term Sheet).
The Treasury retained these voting rights upon conversion to common stock and would
receive standard voting rights associated with the QFI’s common stock. In the event of
conversion, Treasury would also publish a set of guidelines that explained how it would use
these voting rights “prior to closing any transactions” (CAP: Term Sheet).
12. Conditions: Treasury subjected participants to executive compensation and
corporation governance restrictions modeled after those originally passed in
EESA.
Section 111 of EESA outlines executive compensation restrictions and corporate governance
standards (P.L. 110-343). Specifically, Section 111(b) describes these standards as they
apply to direct purchases or investments in financial institutions. Section 111(b)(2) specified
that there would be:
(1) “limits on compensation that exclude incentives for senior executive officers of a
financial institution to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value
of the financial institution during the period that the Secretary holds an equity or
debt position in the financial institution;
(2) “a provision for the recovery by the financial institution of any bonus or incentive
compensation paid to a senior executive officer based on statements of earnings,
gains, or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; and
(3) “a prohibition on the financial institution making any golden parachute payment to
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its senior executive officer during the period that the Secretary holds an equity or
debt position in the financial institution” (P.L. 110-343).
Senior executive officers (SEOs) were initially defined by EESA as the top five highest-paid
executives of companies that took TARP money (P.L. 110-343). However, Treasury passed
several interim final rules that provided additional guidance on executive compensation
post-EESA, as well (TARP Executive Compensation Rules and Guidance).
Treasury released additional guidance in an announcement on February 4, 2009, that
distinguished between institutions that required “exceptional assistance” and institutions
participating in “generally available capital access program[s]” (UST PR, 02/04/2009).
Treasury specified that institutions that received exceptional assistance included AIG,
Citigroup, Bank of America, and the two automakers that received TARP support, GM and
Chrysler (UST PR, 06/10/2009). Institutions that were accepted into the CAP did not
automatically fall under this category, but would if they issued Convertible Preferred in
excess of the 2 percent limit (CAP: Term Sheet).
Institutions that required exceptional assistance were subject to stricter requirements. Total
compensation was restricted to a maximum of $500,000, with any amount in excess required
to be in the form of restricted stock that vested only after the government had been repaid.
This was to ensure that the incentives of executives at these institutions were “aligned with
both the long-term interests of shareholders as well as minimizing the costs to taxpayers”.
Golden parachutes, which were defined as large severance agreements for SEOs, were
completely prohibited for the 10 highest-compensated employees, and capped at one year’s
compensation instead of three years for the next 25 highest-compensated (UST PR,
02/04/2009; UST Report, 10/20/2008).
For institutions that participated in generally available capital programs, SEO total yearly
compensation was limited to $500,000, though this limit could be waived with “full public
disclosure and [a] shareholder vote”. Golden parachute payments for the top five highestpaid employees of these institutions were restricted to one year’s compensation, instead of
three (UST PR, 02/04/2009).
For institutions participating in any of these capital programs, clawback provisions—which
enabled the QFI to retake bonuses and incentive payments of SEOs that had earned them by
knowingly engaging in deceptive practices—were expanded from the top five SEOs to the
next 20 highest-paid employees. The new guidance also required participating institutions
to more aggressively police any luxury expenditures and required the CEO’s sign-off on any
expenditures that “could be viewed as excessive or luxury items” (UST PR, 02/04/2009).
These guidelines, however, did not apply retroactively (UST Report, 06/10/2009).
Treasury published its last Interim Final Rule on June 10, 2009. The final rule implemented
and modified much of the expanded restrictions outlined in ARRA and the February 2009,
guidance. Treasury further limited bonuses and incentive compensation paid to SEOs, as well
as some of the most highly compensated employees, to one third of total compensation, with
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the number of employees affected by this limit increasing based on the amount of aid given.25
The $500,000 limit specified in the February guidance was amended to “link compensation
to long-term firm value” by allowing additional compensation over $500,000, provided that
it was in the form of long-form, restricted stock. The stock-based compensation was still
limited to one third of total compensation. Additionally, golden parachute payment
restrictions were broadened to include any payments that were made as a result of a change
in control of the company. Institutions were required to exercise their clawback provisions
if payments subject to them were found to be based on inaccurate criteria or data, whereas
they were merely given the option to do so in the February guidance (UST PR, 06/10/2009).
The guidance also mandated that TARP recipients hold an annual shareholder vote to
approve executive compensation packages.
The most notable change in the final rule was the creation of a Special Master for TARP
Executive Compensation.26 The Special Master was responsible for reviewing compensation
plans at firms receiving “exceptional” assistance to make sure they did so in a way that
“maximize(s) long-term shareholder value and protect(s) taxpayer interests”.27 This
authority went far beyond the threshold in the earlier guidance. The Special Master was able
to review and approve (or disapprove) the compensation structures of SEOs and the next
100 most highly paid employees, as well as executive officers that were not among the most
highly paid employees and thus, not subject to the typical bonus and incentive payment
restrictions (UST PR, 06/10/2009). Total annual compensation that was less than or equal
to $500,000, not including long-term restricted stock, would automatically be approved by
the Special Master.28 Some of these responsibilities were originally given to the Secretary of
the Treasury as part of the ARRA (P.L. 111-5).
While the February guidelines did not apply retroactively, the Special Master had the power
to evaluate payments, bonuses, or compensation made by any TARP recipient before
February 17, 2009, “to determine whether any such payments were inconsistent with the
purposes of Section 111 of EESA” (UST Report, 06/10/2009). If the Special Master found any
issues, firms could negotiate reimbursements to the US government.

Institutions that received over $500 million in assistance had their top five highest-paid executives, as well
as the 20 next highest-paid affected by the one-third of total compensation limit.
26 A number of the provisions laid out in the June 10 Interim Final Rule, such as the one-thirds limit on total
compensation, as well as the number of SEOs and employees affected by executive compensation restrictions
based on total TARP aid received, were originally passed via Section 111 of the ARRA.
27 In addition to approving compensation agreements, the Special Master was also responsible for reviewing
compensation that was paid prior to the passage of ARRA, as well as negotiating reimbursements for these
where relevant (UST PR, 06/10/2009).
28 Equity-based compensation was included in this limit by using the fair market value on the day of
compensation. Equity-based compensation for prior years would not be included (UST Report, 06/10/2009 p. 29).
25
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13. Exit strategy: Treasury did not develop an explicit strategy for exiting its CAP
investments, although the capital instruments contained built-in exit features.
While no investments were made under the CAP, the design of the Convertible Preferred
gave the government an indirect exit strategy if the backstop was used. Conversion would
occur automatically after seven years. Before that, the QFI could convert the preferred shares
to common equity to boost market confidence or to meet supervisory requirements (CAP:
Term Sheet; CAP: White Paper).
As explained, Treasury was required to sell at least 20 percent of its total original amount of
common stock in a given QFI every year once the conversion had taken place, which put a
cap on the amount of time the government could remain as an investor (CAP: Term Sheet).
The dividend rates, at 9 percent, and other conditions also incentivized banks to replace any
Convertible Preferred with private capital (Glasserman and Wang 2009).

III.

Evaluation

Post-crisis analysis of SCAP and CAP has considered: (1) the transparency of the program;
(2) whether the programs succeeded at increasing banks’ capital through private sources,
returning the government’s investment, and promoting lending in the economy; and (3) the
empirical quality of the stress tests. Much of the analysis focused on SCAP, rather than CAP.
Transparency. SCAP was transparent in both its design and results, aiming to lend credibility
to the stress test and allow markets to make direct comparisons across banks. Such a high
level of transparency was considered necessary to eliminate investor concerns. (Geithner,
Metrick, and Ross, Working Paper)
However, the unusual amount of transparency attracted criticism falling largely into three
groups: (i) Federal Reserve’s release of bank-specific test results broke from the standard
level of confidentiality involved in bank supervision; (ii) the upfront commitment to publicly
disclose the results may encourage supervisors to white-wash the results to protect weak
banks; and (iii) full disclosure of banks’ capital positions would reveal firms as materially
weaker than expected. Geithner, Metrick, and Ross find the third criticism most well-founded
in their recent working paper, noting former Fed chairman Bernanke’s statement, in his
2015 memoir, that disclosing banks’ weakness could “possibly [lead] to new runs and further
sharp declines in bank stock prices” (Bernanke 2015).
Regardless, Geithner, Metrick, and Ross acknowledge transparency in combination with
other features of SCAP made it easier for the banks to raise private capital to meet SCAP
requirements and replace already injected public capital.
Success in meeting goals. The programs succeeded at getting banks to raise capital through
private sources, rather than drawing on the CAP backstop. In the year after the results were
released, the SCAP firms were able to add over $200 billion in common equity. They also
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repaid $124.3 billion in CPP capital and $40 billion in TIP capital (Bernanke, 05/06/2010;
CPP Transaction Data; UST PR, 12/09/2009; UST PR, 12/23/2009).
Officials who worked on the program said the lack of usage of CAP was “a strong indication
of its success, as our objective in the first place was to recapitalize the system with private
capital” (Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020). In a valuation analysis of the Convertible
Preferred, Glasserman and Wang (2009) found that the terms were attractive to banks, yet
none participated. The lack of participation, they stated, could have been due to more
stringent rules on executive compensation and corporate governance, as well as signaling
aspects that could negatively impact banks’ ability to raise private capital (Glasserman and
Wang 2009).
Bernanke, then the Fed chairman, did say that the designers of the program had hoped to
“hasten the return to a better lending environment,” which had not happened in the year
since the results had been released (Bernanke, 05/06/2010).
Evaluation of stress test methodology. A COP report released in June 2009 included an
evaluation of the stress testing methods, written by Professors Eric Talley and Johan Walden,
as an appendix. The analysis found that, based on the short time frame, as well as the extent
of the stress in the banking system, the Federal Reserve’s risk modelling approach was
“reasonable and conservative,” and that they did a commendable job. In particular, the
authors praised the high levels of losses imposed in the more adverse scenario, as well as the
large amount of capital required of those that needed it. They praised the use of survey and
market-based estimates over historical data, use of a two-year time frame, the incorporation
of heterogeneity across BHCs, and the usage of the 6-4 rule as “a defensible first
approximation” (COP, 06/09/2009).
Talley and Walden’s report, however, also included some criticism. The tailoring of loss rates
based on heterogeneous elements amongst the various BHCs, while important, required
“significant interaction” between regulators and BHCs, which could undermine the
objectivity of the tests. The tailoring elements amplified the replicability problem explained
above. Finally, the usage of the holding company itself as the primary unit of analysis was a
subject of debate. The authors felt that, even if a BHC was adequately capitalized on an
aggregate level, the stress tests did not answer the question of how the resources should be
distributed to address risk across its subsidiaries (COP, 06/09/2009).
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report in September 2010 detailing
some of the lessons that could be learned from the SCAP. The multidisciplinary, interagency
approach to the SCAP was a key component of the process, and allowed for “productive
debate” with regards to some of the nuances of the tests, exemplified by the tailored
accounting process done for each BHC (GAO 10-861).
GAO recommended generally for the Fed and other regulators to increase transparency
during the traditional supervisory process, issue more specific guidance for bank examiners
and assessors, fully develop and disseminate among regulators the aforementioned
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surveillance plan to enhance bank supervision, and further increase coordination and
communication amongst regulatory entities (GAO 10-861).

IV.
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Appendixes
Appendix A: Timeline of Key Events
September 15, 2008:

Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy. Bank of America
purchases Merrill Lynch for $50 billion.

September 21, 2008:

The Federal Reserve Board approves the applications of
investment banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to become
bank holding companies, allowing them to access Federal
Reserve liquidity facilities.

September 29, 2008:

The first vote on the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
(EESA) fails in the House of Representatives, with a vote of 205228.

October 3, 2008:

EESA is signed into law. Work on the Troubled Assets Relief
Program (TARP) begins, with the government having access to
the first of two $350 billion tranches of appropriated funds. Wells
Fargo announces proposal to acquire Wachovia.

October 14, 2008:

Treasury announces proposal to use TARP funds to purchase
preferred equity in financial institutions through the $250 billion
Capital Purchase Program (CPP). Nine large, systemically
significant financial institutions pledged to subscribe to the
program for $125 billion. Deadline to apply is November 14,
2008.

January 12, 2009:

President George W. Bush submits report to Congress requesting
disbursement of the remaining $350 billion in TARP funds to be
used by the incoming Obama administration.

February 10, 2009:

Treasury announces the details of its Financial Stability Plan,
which includes stress tests, a capital backstop, as well as new
lending initiatives and expansions of existing programs.

February 17, 2009:

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) is
passed. In addition to large amounts of stimulus spending and tax
cuts, ARRA also broadens the original executive compensation
restrictions for TARP recipients that came with EESA and gives
the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to review
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compensation plans of some of the highest-paid executives of
TARP recipients.
February 25, 2009:

Federal bank regulators, such as the FDIC, OCC, and Federal
Reserve Board announce intent to begin stress testing US bank
holding companies with assets exceeding $100 billion. Treasury
announces the Capital Assistance Program, an unlimited capital
backstop for banks to receive additional government capital in
exchange for Convertible Preferred stock.

April 24, 2009:

The Federal Reserve publicly releases a paper about its stress
testing program, called the Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program (SCAP), giving key details about the design of the tests,
as well as how the Fed calculated losses across the firms that
were tested.

May 7, 2009:

Results of the SCAP for 19 large financial institutions are released,
which show a $75 billion capital shortfall for 10 bank holding
companies, largely in the form of common equity.

June 10, 2009:

Treasury releases its Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for
Compensation and Corporate Governance. The rule implements
and further expands the restrictions laid out in ARRA, as well as
appoints a Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation,
which is responsible for reviewing compensation plans for
institutions receiving “exceptional assistance”.

November 9, 2009:

The Capital Assistance Program closes after six months. No
investments are made under the program and all of the bank
holding companies that need capital as a part of SCAP are able to
raise it privately.

July 21, 2010:

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 is passed. The Act establishes the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau and Financial Stability Oversight Council,
removes Treasury’s ability to reuse TARP funds, more stringently
regulates the activities of banks and bank holding companies, and
institutes mandatory annual stress tests for some of the largest
bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies.
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Appendix B: Overview of Initial Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests
Regulatory Guidance
The Federal Reserve, OCC, and Treasury released several Final Rules in October of 2012,
which served as implementation and clerical guidelines for regulators and participating
institutions.
The first, which was published in by the OCC and Treasury in the Federal Register on October
9, 2012, laid out the methodology and reporting requirements for participants in detail.
Unlike in the initial legislation, the Final Rule categorized institutions as either “$10 to $50
billion covered” or “over $50 billion covered”, based on their average total consolidated
assets (Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 195, 10/09/2012 – p. 61246).29 Regulators gave smaller
covered institutions (less than $50 billion) more than a year longer to both conduct and
report the results of their stress tests compared with covered institutions of $50 billion.30
However, there were cases in which institutions with less than $50 billion in assets were
affiliated with the covered institutions of more than $50 billion, which meant that it could be
“less burdensome and more appropriate” for these institutions to follow the requirements
for covered institutions of more than $50 billion, instead (Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 195,
10/09/2012 – p. 61242).
Participating institutions were required to estimate PPNR, losses, loan-loss provisions, net
income, ALLL for credit exposures, and general effects of capital actions on their capital
levels over the “planning horizon”, which had to be at least nine quarters (Federal Register,
Vol. 77, No. 195, 10/09/2012 – p. 61247).
While the initial reports given to regulators were confidential, all participants were required
to publish the results of the tests either between March 15 and 31 of the following calendar
year for covered institutions of more than $50 billion, or between June 15 and 30 of the
following calendar year for covered institutions of $10 to $50 billion (Federal Register, Vol.
77, No. 195, 10/09/2012 – p. 61248). For the first set of results, this would mean that
covered institutions would have had to publish their results between March 15 to 31, 2013,
and June 15 to 30, 2014 (Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 195, 10/09/2012 – p. 61248).

Average total consolidated assets, for purposes of the Dodd-Frank stress tests, were calculated by taking the
average of an institution’s total consolidated assets found in its Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income
for the four most recent consecutive quarters. If a report had not been filed in one or more of the four most
recent quarters, it would be calculated as the average of the institution’s total consolidated assets “for the most
recent one or more consecutive quarters” (Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 195, 10/09/2012 – p. 61246).
30 Covered institutions of $10 to $50 billion were required to use financial statement data as of September 30,
2013, and report their test results on or before March 31, 2014, whereas covered institutions of $50 billion
were required to use financial statement data as of September 30, 2012, and report their results on or before
January 5, 2013 (Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 195, 10/09/2012 – p. 61246). In all cases, data as of September
30 of the current calendar year had to be used.
29
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Two more Final Rules were issued on October 12, 2012, for each of the covered groups. While
the language was similar in the Rules for each of the two groups, and was akin to what was
issued by the OCC and Treasury, it differed in the following ways:
(1) A delay in the date that these companies were to begin and publicly report the results of
their stress tests. A company that met the requirements at the end of 2013 would be tested
in 2014, and report their results in 2015, for example (Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 198,
10/12/2012 – pp. 62399).31
(2) Further clarification of the definition of the three “scenarios” that the OCC and Treasury
had outlined in their Final Rule. The baseline scenario was similar to the SCAP: a consensus
view of the macroeconomic outlook as represented by forecasters, government agencies, and
other organizations. The adverse scenario would likely “include the paths of economic
variables that are generally consistent with mild to moderate recessions,” with the
possibility of the approach varying from year-to-year based on current economic conditions.
The more adverse scenario, on the other hand, was expected to follow the path that was
consistent with “severe post-war US recessions” (Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 198,
10/12/2012 – pp. 62403-62404).
(3) An increased emphasis on tailoring stress test elements to idiosyncratic elements among
tested institutions. The Federal Reserve Board emphasized that, “depending on the systemic
footprint and scope of operations” of a given institution, they could potentially require
“additional components in its adverse and severely adverse scenarios or to use additional
scenarios that are designed to capture salient risks stemming from specific lines of business”
(Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 198, 10/12/2012 – p. 62404).
(4) A more detailed list of assumptions about capital actions when analyzing the impact of
the test over the planning horizon. These involved taking into account actual capital actions
undertaken at the end of the first quarter, as well as payments on any instruments included
in regulatory capital ratios (such as common stock dividends, interest, or principal
payments), and an assumption of “no redemption” on any instrument that would be included
in the institution’s regulatory capital ratios (Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 198, 10/12/2012
– p. 62408).
(5) Additional stress tests conducted every six months by covered institutions of more than
$50 billion only. These would be completed by January 5 and June 5 every year, with the
former following the same procedures and scenarios as the Fed’s tests, while the mid-year
tests, which were based on asset values as of March 31, were conducted more independently.
In particular, companies were expected to assess their own unique vulnerabilities and

This included a delay for covered institutions of $10 billion to $50 billion that were eligible for the stress
tests as of the end of 2012. These institutions, despite being required to report in 2014, did not have to do so
until June 2015 (Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 198, 10/12/2012 – p. 62399). This delay also applied for covered
institutions of more than $50 billion that did not participate in SCAP, who would begin testing in September
2013 instead of November 2012 (Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 198, 10/12/2012 – p. 62381).
31
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idiosyncratic risks as part of the adverse and more adverse scenarios in the mid-year tests
(Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 198, 10/12/2012 – pp. 62387).
These Final Rules and related publications further built on the foundations that the SCAP
created, and the Fed continues to release both the DFAST results and methodology to the
public (FRB: Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests).
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